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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different
population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is
inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but
can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size,
n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff
from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive
rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games.
We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact
conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has
the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven
for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size
of n = 2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n ≥ 3 it holds
for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner’s dilemma and
hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by
allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups.
Keywords: evolution of multicellularity, evolutionary game theory,
cooperation, complexity.
1. Introduction
The emergence of multicellular life forms is an important step in the evolu-
tionary history of life on earth (Grosberg and Strathmann, 2007; Bell and Moo-
ers, 1997; Knoll, 2011; Bonner, 1998, 2009a; Rokas, 2008; Carroll, 2001; Bonner,
2009b; Rainey, 2007; Michod, 1997, 1996; Michod and Roze, 2001; Hanschen
et al, 2015). Multicellularity arose numerous times in prokaryotes, including
in cyanobacteria, actinomycetes, and myxobacteria (Grosberg and Strathmann,
2007; Bell and Mooers, 1997; Schirrmeister et al, 2011). Complex multicellular
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organisms evolved in six eukaryotic groups: animals, plants, fungi as well as
brown, green and red algae.
A comparison between simple multicellular and their relative unicellular or-
ganisms indicates multiple evolutionary transitions. These include increase in
genetic complexity, cell differentiation, cell adhesion and cell-to-cell communi-
cation (Rokas, 2008). Division of labor, efficient dispersal, improved metabolic
efficiency, and limiting interaction with non-cooperative individuals have been
suggested as advantageous traits offered by multicellularity (Michod and Roze,
2001; Michod, 2007; Bonner, 1998; Pfeiffer et al, 2001; Pfeiffer and Bonhoef-
fer, 2003; Kirk, 2005; Mora Van Cauwelaert et al, 2015)(see also Grosberg and
Strathmann (2007) and references therein.)
Multicellular organisms are usually formed by single cells whose daughter
cells stay together after division (Bonner, 1998; Koschwanez et al, 2011; Maliet
et al, 2015; Rossetti et al, 2011). In contrast, multicellular organisms via ag-
gregation are formed by separate cells coming together. Staying together and
coming together lead to very different evolutionary dynamics (Tarnita et al,
2013), and pose different challenges for the problem of evolution of cooperation
(Nowak, 2006b; Nowak et al, 2010a; Olejarz and Nowak, 2014). The same two
modes for the evolution of complexity are also observed in the context of eu-
sociality among insects (Wilson, 1971; Gadagkar and Bonner, 1994; Gadagkar,
2001; Hunt, 2007). A common route to eusociality is daughters staying with
their mothers (Nowak et al, 2010b), but there is also the coming together of
different individuals in the formation of new colonies (Wilson, 1971; Gadagkar,
2001).
Here, we carry out a theoretical study of the dynamics underlying the evolu-
tion of multicellularity. Previous studies of such dynamics, both theoretical and
experimental, have often been carried out under the assumption that within-
group fitnesses derive from a simple, additive cooperative dilemma. For exam-
ple, cells producing ATP from an external energy resource might do so with
high yield but low rate, or with low yield but high rate (Pfeiffer et al, 2001).
In the context of a group of cells trying to make use of an energy resource, the
former behaviour characterizes cooperators, and the latter defectors, because
the benefits of a high rate of resource use accrue to the individual cell, while the
costs of inefficient resource use accrue more broadly within the group (Pfeiffer
and Bonhoeffer, 2003). If the costs accrue equally to all group members, the
strategic problem within the group can be conceptualized as an additive public
goods game. Many other models of the evolution of multicellularity can be con-
ceptualized in the same way (Penn et al, 2012). For example, the aggregation of
biofilms in Pseudomonas bacteria involves the production, costly to individual
providers, of the components of an extracellular matrix and other substances
(Davies and Geesey, 1995; Matsukawa and Greenberg, 2004; Diggle et al, 2006).
This assumption reduces the strategic conflicts within each multicellular unit
to a very simple, frequency-independent form (Michod, 1999). Because a group’s
reproductive success is shared equally among its constituents (no matter their
type), the only within-group conflict involves the constant cost to cooperation.
This is not realistic in many scenarios. In the example of ATP production
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described above, if the benefits of efficient resource use accrue more locally than
to the whole group (for example, to pairs of interacting cells within the group),
then the strategic interactions among cells are more complicated than a linear
public goods game (Fig.1). Without taking this into account (i.e., assuming that
the benefits produced by cooperators are shared evenly among group members),
it would seem that defectors should always be at an advantage within the group.
But once the strategic complexity of local interactions is taken into account,
then cooperators can have a within-group advantage if most of their interactions
within the group are with fellow cooperators (Fig.1).
Another example where strategic interaction within the group is important
is when certain cell types are preferentially found in the reproductive propagules
emitted by the group. Thus, in multicellular clusters of the yeast Saccharomyces
cerevisiae, experimentally selected for by gravity-based methods, some cells (co-
operators) undergo apoptosis to destabilise the multicellular unit and create new
propagules; having apoptosed, they cannot themselves be in these propagules
(Ratcliff et al, 2012; Pentz et al, 2015).
Another example involves cells that either aggressively or passively try to
sequester resources for themselves; if the presence of many aggressive types
involves a destructive cost to them, then the within-group conflict resembles a
hawk-dove game. Because the within-group conflicts are frequency-independent
in this example, their effects in the context of the evolution of multicellularity
cannot be understood under a linear public goods conceptualization.
To put it concisely, the evolution of multicellularity is often studied in a
framework that does not adequately account for the interactions of cells within
a group. In this paper, we place the evolution of multicellularity into an ex-
plicitly game-theoretic framework. Evolutionary game dynamics is the study of
frequency dependent selection (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998; Nowak, 2006a). The success of a genotype (or phenotype or strategy) de-
pends on the frequency of different genotypes in the population. Evolutionary
game dynamics was initially studied in well-mixed and infinitely large popula-
tions using deterministic differential equations (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Weibull, 1997). More recently it has moved to finite
population sizes using stochastic dynamics (Nowak, 2006a; Taylor et al, 2004;
Traulsen and Hauert, 2009). Evolutionary games are also studied in structured
populations (Nowak and May, 1992; Page et al, 2000; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004;
Ohtsuki et al, 2006; Szabo´ et al, 2000; Tarnita et al, 2009b,a; Hauert and Imhof,
2012; Langer et al, 2008; Antal et al, 2009b; Allen and Nowak, 2015; Cooney
et al, 2016).
A game-theoretic approach to the evolution of multicellularity allows us
to generalize the traditional framework by accounting for frequency-dependent
competition within multicellular units.
The primary goal of our paper is to understand how the population struc-
ture of simple multicellularity affects the outcome of biological games. Previous
studies have explored the evolutionary emergence of staying together (Tarnita
et al, 2013) in the context of diffusible public goods (Olejarz and Nowak, 2014)
and in stochastic dynamics (Ghang and Nowak, 2014). Here we study determin-
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istic evolutionary dynamics in a population where staying together has already
evolved.
In our model, single cells divide, but the two daughter cells can stay together
after cell division. These cells may undergo further division until the complex
reaches a specified maximum size. Thereafter, the complex does not grow further
but produces single-cellular offspring, which subsequently form new complexes.
Within a complex, cells interact according to a biological game. This means they
derive payoffs which affect their reproductive rate. We consider natural selection
acting on two types of cells (or strategies), determined by their genotype.
We include mutation between the two types, assumed to occur during cell
division. Each offspring adopts its parent’s type with probability 1 − u and
changes to the other type with probability u. We shall be interested both in
low rates of mutation (corresponding, for example, to nucleotide substitutions)
and in very high rates of mutation (for example, genetic switches, epigenetic
marking, or structural mutations deriving from a modular genetic architecture
– a fuller discussion of these is provided in the Discussion section). In the
absence of mutation, u = 0, one of the two types is bound to take over the
whole population (fixation). With mutation, 0 < u < 1, the system goes to
a mutation-selection equilibrium in which both types are present. We can say
that selection favours one type if it is more abundant at equilibrium (Antal et al,
2009a; Tarnita et al, 2009b; Allen and Tarnita, 2014).
For the simple case of a maximum complex of size n = 2, we derive exact
solutions for the model and for the condition that a strategy (or type) is fa-
vored for any intensity of selection. Subsequently, we derive results for weak
selection for any maximum complex size, n ≥ 3. Our results have the same
symmetry as the well known σ-condition for evolutionary graphs and evolution-
ary sets (Tarnita et al, 2009b). The σ-condition is an algebraic condition that
describes when selection favours one strategy over another. The σ-condition
holds for any population structure that treats the two strategies symmetrically
for stochastic evolutionary dynamics and for weak selection. For more refer-
ences on σ-conditions, see Tarnita et al (2011); McAvoy and Hauert (2015);
Nathanson et al (2009); Nowak et al (2010a); Allen et al (2012). In our case a
σ-type condition arises for a deterministic evolutionary process. For n = 2 it
holds for any intensity of selection. For n ≥ 3 it holds for weak selection.
We apply our finding to evolution of cooperation and to the hawk-dove game.
We observe that the population structure of simple multicellularity can easily
favor cooperation over defection and doves over hawks.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic model
for a maximum complex size of n = 2 and state the main results. In Section
3 we study evolution of cooperation and the hawk-dove game. We also discuss
how the average fitness at equilibrium depends on the mutation rate in these
two games. In Section 4, we discuss the model for n ≥ 3 and derive the re-
currence relations for equilibrium solutions. In Section 5, we derive generalized
σ-condition for weak selection and show that the results match numerical solu-
tions. In Appendices A and C, we discuss technical details for the n = 2 and
n = 3 analytical solutions. In Appendix B, we address evolutionary stability for
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n = 2. In Appendix D, we discuss the selection condition for an unstructured
game which corresponds to σ = 1 (Antal et al, 2009a).
2. Model and results for maximum complex size n = 2
We consider a model with two types of cells, 0 and 1. Both cell types divide
and reproduce. They also have a chance of staying together to form complexes.
The two-cell complexes can be either 00, 01 or 11. For the moment we limit
ourselves to a model with maximum complex size, n = 2. If a cell in a complex
of size two reproduces, the daughter cell leaves and joins the pool of single cells.
During each cell division, there is a probability of mutation. An offspring
of a type 0 cell mutates to a type 1 cell with probability u or remains a type 0
cell with probability 1 − u. We assume symmetric mutations: the probability
to mutate from 0 to 1 is the same as from 1 to 0.
The division rate of single cells is set to unity. The model is depicted in
Fig. 2. Denoting the abundances of type 0 and type 1 cells by x0 and x1 and
denoting the abundances of the complexes 00, 01 and 11 by x00, x01 and x11,
we can write the dynamics of these five populations as
x˙0 = P00x00 + P01x01 + P11x11 − x0 − x0φ
x˙1 = Q00x00 +Q01x01 +Q11x11 − x1 − x1φ
x˙00 = (1− u)x0 − x00φ
x˙01 = u(x0 + x1)− x01φ
x˙11 = (1− u)x1 − x11φ (1)
The coefficients P00, P01 and P11 denote the rates at which these complexes
generate type 0 cells, while the coefficients Q00, Q01 and Q11 denote the rates at
which these complexes generate type 1 cells. These coefficients depend on the
payoff derived from the game, the intensity of selection and the mutation rate.
They are as follows
P00 = 2(1 + wa)(1− u)
P01 = (1 + wb)(1− u) + (1 + wc)u
P11 = 2(1 + wd)u
Q00 = 2(1 + wa)u
Q01 = (1 + wb)u+ (1 + wc)(1− u)
Q11 = 2(1 + wd)(1− u) (2)
The parameters a, b, c, d are the elements of the 2× 2 payoff matrix
( 0 1
0 a b
1 c d
)
(3)
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Figure 1: Growth of a simple multicellular complex containing two competing metabolic
phenotypes (Pfeiffer et al, 2001). The cooperator phenotype (blue) uses the limited food
resource to produce ATP with high efficiency but low rate; the defector phenotype produces
ATP with low efficiency but high rate. If the benefits of efficient resource use are shared
equitably among the whole group, and the benefits of a high rate of resource use are enjoyed by
individual cells, then the within-group conflict is a linear public goods game. In this case, the
results of interactions within the group are frequency-independent, and defectors always grow
as a proportion of the group. On the other hand, if the benefit of efficient resource use is shared
more locally, then within-group strategic interactions are more complex. Now, cooperators
can increase as a proportion of the group if they typically interact with cooperators, which
can occur, for example, if a viscous spatial structure governs interactions (pictured).
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Figure 2: All possible events in a game of multicellularity if the maximum complex size is
n = 2. Type 0 cells are shown in blue, and type 1 cells are in shown red. The frequencies
of single cells of type 0 and 1 are denoted by x0 and x1. The frequencies of 00, 01 and 11
complexes are denoted by x00, x01, x11, respectively. The division rates of single cells of both
types are set to unity. The coefficients P00, P01 and P11 denote the rates at which these
complexes generate type 0 cells. The coefficients Q00, Q01 and Q11 denote the rates at which
these complexes generate type 1 cells.
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In each complex a type 0 cell obtains payoff a from another type 0 cell, and
b from a type 1 cell. Similarly, a type 1 cell obtains payoff c from a type 0 cell,
and d from a type 1 cell. The game interaction occurs only between cells within
the same complex. The intensity of selection is denoted by w and measures how
much the payoff of the game contributes to the fitness.
Note that the reproductive rate of a cell, which multiplies the mutation rate,
must always be non-negative. Therefore we require 1 + wmin{a, b, c, d} ≥ 0. If
some entries of the payoff matrix are negative then these conditions limit the
maximum intensity of selection.
The average fitness, φ, is obtained from the constraint that the relative
abundances sum up to unity, x0 + x1 + 2(x00 + x01 + x11) = 1. We have
φ = (P00 +Q00)x00 + (P01 +Q01)x01 + (P11 +Q11)x11 + x0 + x1 (4)
The equilibrium abundances are obtained by setting all time derivates in Eq.
1 equal to zero. The solutions can be expressed in terms of ratio of type 1 to
type 0 singlets η? = x?1/x
?
0 and the value of average fitness at equilibrium, φ
?:
x?0 =
φ?
2 + φ?
1
1 + η?
x?1 =
φ?
2 + φ?
η?
η? + 1
x?00 =
1− u
2 + φ?
1
1 + η?
x?01 =
u
2 + φ?
x?11 =
1− u
2 + φ?
η?
1 + η?
(5)
Eq. 5 and the values of φ? and η? in terms of game payoffs and mutation rate
are derived in Appendix A (Eqs. A.5-A.7). The total equilibrium abundances
of type 0 and type 1 cells are
x?tot,0 ≡ x?0 + 2x?00 + x?01
=
1
1 + η?
1
2 + φ?
(
φ? + 2(1− u) + u(1 + η?))
x?tot,1 ≡ x?1 + 2x?11 + x?01
=
1
1 + η?
1
2 + φ?
(
φ?η? + 2η?(1− u) + u(1 + η?)) (6)
A strategy is favored by selection, if its equilibrium frequency is greater than
what it is in the neutral case. Here the neutral abundance of type 0 and type 1
is 1/2. Thus, the condition for type 0 to be selected over type 1 is that the total
number of type 0 cells is larger than total number of type 1 cells at equilibrium
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x?tot,0 > x
?
tot,1 (7)
Substituting from Eq. 6, and using the fact that the average fitness is always
positive, φ? > 0, we arrive at the condition
η? < 1 (8)
Substituting for η? from Eq. A.6, and Eq. A.5, Eq. 8 becomes(
u− 1
2
)(1− u
u
a+ b− c− 1− u
u
d
)
< 0 (9)
There are two zeros for the equality. We denote them u1 and u2. We have
u2 = 1/2 and
u1 =
a− d
a− d+ c− b (10)
If u is outside the interval of (u1, u2) (or (u2, u1) if u2 < u1) then type 0 is
favored. Inside this interval, however, type 1 is selected.
For u < u1 (assuming u1 < u2) the condition for type 0 to be favored
simplifies to
σa+ b > c+ σd (11)
Here σ = (1−u)/u is only a function of u and independent of the payoff values.
This condition, also known as the σ-condition, has been discussed in the past
for other population structures for stochastic dynamics (Tarnita et al, 2009b,
2011). The value σ = 1 leads to the risk dominance condition in unstructured
evolutionary games; see Appendix D, as well as Harsanyi and Selten (1988);
Antal et al (2009a). Notice that our result for multicellular games holds for any
selection intensity.
The same result can be intuitively argued in the weak selection limit. Inside
a complex, fitness gains δf0 and δf1 of type 0 and type 1 cells are
δf0 = 2ax
?
00 + bx
?
01
δf1 = 2dx
?
11 + cc
?
01 (12)
The condition for type 0 strategy to be selected is
δf0 > δf1 (13)
If the finesses of the two phenotypes (0 and 1) were the same we would have equal
abundances for type 0 and type 1 cells in the system. At weak selection we can
replace x?00, x
?
01, x
?
11 with w = 0 abundances xˆ
?
00 = xˆ
?
11 = (1 − u)/6, xˆ?01 = u/3.
Here xˆ denotes the w → 0 limit. Substituting these values into Eq. 13 we
recover the σ-condition, Eq. 11. The interplay between payoffs and mutation
rates can be readily seen from Eqs.12 and 13, where values of frequencies at
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zero selection intensity are determined solely by u whereas the fitness gains
per cell are determined by the payoffs. To see the connection between the two
derivations, we can verify that Eq. 13 is equivalent to
P00xˆ
?
00 + P01xˆ
?
01 + P11xˆ
?
11 > Q00xˆ
?
00 +Q01xˆ
?
01 +Q11xˆ
?
11 (14)
for u < u1. This is basically the weak selection limit of the x
?
0 > x
?
1 condition
as in Eq. 8.
In the above discussion we have assumed a positive mutation rate u > 0. It
was implied that the σ-condition holds for some mutation rate 0 < u < 1. In
fact, from Eq. 9, the condition for dominance of type 0 for u → 0 simplifies
to a > d. As shown in Appendix B this is the condition for type 0 to be an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) at weak selection. If a < d then the type 1
strategy is ESS, and for u < u1 type 1 is selected.
The uniqueness of solutions for Eqs.1-5 is true for u 6= 0. At u = 0, there are
two equilibrium solutions for the model. One of the two fixed-points consists of
all type 0 cells and and the other is all type 1. Only one of the two strategies can
be ESS. Thus for u = 0 we always have an attractive (Lyapunov stable) fixed
point (type 0 if a > d) and a saddle-point corresponding to the other strategy.
For unstructured evolutionary games, the σ-condition simplifies to the condition
for risk dominance, a+ b > c+ d, and the condition for evolutionary stability is
the same as the Pareto efficiency, a > d.
3. Examples
3.1. Cooperation
Consider the payoff matrix for a simplified game of cooperation
( C D
C B − C −C
D B 0
)
(15)
Here B and C indicate benefit and cost values respectively.. Type 0 cells denote
the cooperator strategy, C. Type 1 cells denote the defector strategy, D. Inside
a complex, a type 0 cell pays a cost, C, and provides a benefit, B, to the other
cell. A type 1 cell pays no cost and provides no benefit.
At zero mutation and for B > C the dynamics is driven by pure complexes,
00 and 11. Here cooperator complexes are advantaged over defector complexes.
Mixed complexes, 01, are bound to become extinct. In this population struc-
ture, cooperators are evolutionarily stable. This is in contrast to evolution of
cooperation in unstructured populations where defectors are stable.
For 0 < u < 1/2, the σ-condition can be written in terms of cost and benefit
values as
B
C >
1− u
u
(16)
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Figure 3: Numerical equilibrium solutions for the game of cooperation and the hawk-dove
game. The total abundances of type 0 cells (blue) and type 1 cells (red) are plotted as a
function of the mutation rate, u. The parameters are B = 5 (benefit) and C = 1 (cost).
Different graphs correspond to varying selection intensity w = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5; the curvature
increases with w.
The critical mutation rate is
u1 =
1
2
(
1− 1B/C
)
<
1
2
= u2 (17)
Values of x?tot,0 and x
?
tot,1 as functions of u are plotted in Fig. 3 for parameters
B = 5 and C = 1. For these parameter values we observe u1 = 0.4 and u2 = 0.5,
in agreement with Eq. 17. In Fig. 4 frequencies of all populations (singlets and
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Figure 4: Equilibrium solutions for all singlet and doublet abundances in the game of cooper-
ation and the hawk-dove game. All the abundances are plotted as a function of the mutation
rate, u. Parameters are B = 5, C = 1 and w = 0.1.
complexes) are plotted as a function of u for the same cost and benefit values
and w = 0.1. We see that the condition x?tot,0 > x
?
tot,1 coincides with x
?
0 > x
?
1
in agreement with Eq.8. Eq. 17 describes the phase boundary in the space
of mutation and benefit-to-cost ratio. This is depicted in Fig. 5. The region
between the curves (u1,B/C) and (u2,B/C) is where the defector strategy is
selected. The two phase boundaries never meet as u1 = u2 = 1/2 does not have
a positive finite solution for B/C. In fact u = u2 is the vertical asymptote of the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio as a function of u.
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Figure 5: Phase diagram of the cooperation game (top) and the hawk-dove game (bottom).
In the cooperation game, cooperators are favored for u < u1 and u2 = 1/2 < u and B > C
(regions I and III). In the hawk-dove game, hawks are favored for u1 < u < u2 = 1/2 and
B > 2C (region II).
13
3.2. Hawk-dove
Now consider a hawk-dove game given by the payoff matrix

H D
H
B − C
2
B
D 0
B
2
 (18)
Type 0 is hawk (H) and type 1 is dove (D). Inside 00 complexes each hawk
gains payoff B/2 and pays the cost C/2. In a 01 complex, a hawk gains payoff
B while a dove does not gain from the interaction. For 11 complexes, each dove
gains B/2. From Eq. 9 and for u < 1/2, the σ-condition is written as
B
C >
1− u
2u
(19)
Therefore, we have
u1 =
1
1 + 2B/C (20)
As discussed before we expect the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to
dominate for small values of the mutation rate u < u1. In the hawk-dove game,
as a result of the multicellular population structure, the ESS is type 1 (dove).
This can also be seen from numerical solutions of the model. The total type
0 and 1 abundances for various intensities of selection are plotted in Fig. 3
for B = 5 and C = 1. For these benefit and cost values we observe u1 = 0.09
and u2 = 0.5. We also plot the abundances of single cells and complexes in
Fig. 4 for w = 0.1. In Fig. 5 the phase diagram of the hawk-dove game is
plotted in agreement with Eq. 20. The regions between the curve (u1,B/C) and
(u2,B/C) are where the hawk strategy is favored and vice versa. The topology
of this phase diagram is different from the cooperation game as the two phase
boundaries (u1,B/C) and (u2,B/C) meet at B = 2C.
3.3. Average fitness
We now study how the average fitness at equilibrium, φ?, depends on the
mutation rate, u. The average fitness at equilibrium is calculated in Appendix
A, Eq.A.4
φ? = −1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + 4
(
D0(1− z) +D1z
)
(21)
Here z ≡ η?/(1+η?) = x?1/(x?0 +x?1) is the fraction of type 1 singlets. Note that
z is a function of u and of the payoff values. From Eq. A.5, the coefficients D0
and D1 are
D0 = 2
(
1 + wa
)
+ w
(
b+ c− 2a)u
D1 = 2
(
1 + wd
)
+ w
(
b+ c− 2d)u (22)
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If a > d then type 0 is ESS and as u→ 0, we have z → 0. In this case z is an
increasing function near u = 0 and therefore z
′
(u = 0) > 0. If a < d then type
1 is ESS and as u → 0, we have z → 1. In this case z′(u = 0) < 0. Denoting
average fitness in this limit with φ?0 we have
φ?0 = −
1
2
+
1
2
√
9 + 8w ·max(a, d)
Similarly one can show that at u = 1 the average fitness, denoted by φ?1, is
φ?1 = −
1
2
+
1
2
√
9 + 4w(b+ c) (23)
For the game of cooperation, if the benefit-to-cost ratio is greater than unity,
the condition (b+ c)/2 < a = max(a, d) is satisfied. Thus φ?0 is larger than φ
?
1.
For the hawk-dove game, on the other hand, we have (b+ c)/2 < d = max(a, d)
and thus φ?0 < φ
?
1.
We now show that for the hawk-dove game, φ?0 and φ
?
1 are local and global
maxima of φ?, respectively. Since φ? is an increasing function of G ≡ D0(z −
1) +D1z, we look at derivative of this term as a function of u
dG
du
= D
′
0 +
(
D
′
1 −D
′
0
)
z +
(
D1 −D0
)
z
′
= w(b+ c− 2a) + 2w(a− d)z − 2w(a− d)(1− u)z′ (24)
The prime symbol represents the derivative with respect to u. At u = 0 we
have z(u = 0) = 1 and z
′
(u = 0) < 0. For u = 1 we have z(u = 1) < 1
and z
′
(u = 1) > 0. Using these results and inserting the payoff values of the
hawk-dove game we obtain
dG
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
= wC · z′(u = 0) < 0
dG
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=1
= wC(1− z(u = 1)) > 0 (25)
The inequalities are true for C > 0. Thus for the hawk-dove, φ?0 and φ?1 are
local maxima. The average fitness at u = 1 mutation is a global maximum. The
signs of derivatives at Eq. 25 imply that there is a global minimum for u? at
0 < u? < 1/2. These results can be compared with numerical results in Fig. 6.
The same analysis can be done for the game of cooperation. Following similar
steps we get
dG
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
= −w(B − C)(1 + 2z′(u = 0)) < 0
dG
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=1
= −w(B − C)(1− 2z(u = 1)) < 0 (26)
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Figure 6: Numerical solutions for the equilibrium average fitness, φ?, as a function of the
mutation rate, u. For the game of cooperation φ? has a global maximum at u = 0 and a local
minimum at u = 1 (top). For the hawk-dove game, φ? has a local maximum at u = 0 and a
global maximum at u = 1 (bottom). Parameter values: w = 0.5 and C = 1.
The inequalities hold for B > C. We have also used z(u = 0) = 0, z′(u = 0) > 0
and z(u = 1) < 1/2, z
′
(u = 1) < 0.
4. Model for larger complexes, n ≥ 3
We now generalize the model to arbitrary maximum complex size, n. Com-
plexes of sizes 2 to n can now coexist. Each complex can be a mixture of type
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+ux1,0
ux0,1
(1  u)x0,1
P1,1x1,1
Q2,0x2,0
Q2,1x2,1
Q3,0x3,0
P3,1x3,1
+ Q2,2x2,2
Figure 7: A general model for games of multicellularity. The figure depicts some of the possible
reactions and the corresponding rates for n = 4. The abundance of a complex of size k with
i many type 0 cells is denoted by xi,k−i. The coefficients Pi,j denote the rates at which
complexes with i type 0 cells and j type 1 cells generate type 0 offsprings. Similarly, Qi,j
denote the rate at which the same complex generates type 1 cells. (See Eq. 30.)
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0 and type 1 cells. Cells divide and offspring stay together with their parents.
Thus, a complex of size k produces a complex of size k + 1. Each offspring
adopts its parent’s type with probability 1 − u and changes to the other type
with probability u. The offspring of cells inside a complex of maximum size
leave the complex and the pool of single cells. Cells inside a complex gain
payoff through a biological game with pairwise interactions.
The abundance of a complex of size k with i many cells of type 0 cells and
k − i many cells of type 1 is denoted by xi,k−i. For example, x00 in previous
notation is now x2,0. Similarly, x01 becomes x1,1, while x11 becomes x0,2 and
so on.
The evolutionary dynamics can be written as a system of differential equa-
tions
x˙1,0 =
n∑
l=0
Pl,n−lxl,n−l − x1,0 − x1,0φ
x˙0,1 =
n∑
l=0
Ql,n−lxl,n−l − x0,1 − x0,1φ
...
x˙i,k−i = Pi−1,k−ixi−1,k−i +Qi,k−i−1xi,k−i−1
−
(
Pi,k−i +Qi,k−i
)
xi,k−i − xi,k−iφ
(1 ≤ k < n, 0 ≤ i ≤ k)
...
x˙i,n−i = Pi−1,n−ixi−1,n−i +Qi,n−i−1xi,n−i−1
− xi,n−iφ
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) (27)
Again the average fitness φ is given by the condition that total relative abun-
dances of type 0 and type 1 cells add up to one, that is
n∑
k=1
k ·
( k∑
i=0
xi,k−i
)
= 1 (28)
Thus,
φ =
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
(
Pi,k−i +Qi,k−i
)
xi,k−i (29)
The coefficients Pi,j and Qi,j are the production rates for creating a type 0 or
type 1 cell inside a complex of size k = i + j. They are expressed in terms of
the game payoffs, the mutation rate, u, and the intensity of selection, w
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Pi,j = i ·
(
1 + w(a(i− 1) + bj))(1− u) + j · (1 + w(ic+ (j − 1)d))u
Qi,j = i ·
(
1 + w(a(i− 1) + bj))u+ j · (1 + w(ic+ (j − 1)d))(1− u)
(30)
Here i is the number of type 0 cells and j = k − i is the number of type 1 cells
inside the complex.
The fixed points of the above system of equations are obtained by putting
the right-hand side of Eq. 27 equal to zero. The solutions, x?i,k−i are given by
x?1,0 =
1
1 + φ?
n∑
l=0
Pl,n−lx?l,n−l
x?0,1 =
1
1 + φ?
n∑
l=0
Ql,n−lx?l,n−l
...
x?i,k−i =
(
φ? + Pi,k−i +Qi,k−i
)−1
×
(
Pi−1,k−ix?i−1,k−i +Qi,k−i−1x
?
i,k−i−1
)
(0 < k < n, 0 ≤ i ≤ k)
...
x?i,n−i =
1
φ?
(
Pi−1,n−ix?i−1,n−i +Qi,n−i−1x
?
i,n−i−1
)
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) (31)
To solve Eq. 31 analytically, we can, in principle, follow the same method as
used in Section 2 (and in Appendix A). The abundances x?i,k−i can be expressed
in terms of η? ≡ x?0,1/x?1,0 and the average fitness φ?. The system of equations
31 can be reduced to two equations for η? and φ?. We have presented a sketch
of this method in Appendix C for n = 3. A general approach for arbitrary n is
similar but the solutions become cumbersome as n increases.
At w = 0 the dynamics is neutral. In this limit we have φ? = 1. Eq. 31
becomes a system of linear recurrence equations
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xˆ?1,0 =
1
2
n∑
l=0
Pˆl,n−lxˆ?l,n−l
xˆ?0,1 =
1
2
n∑
l=0
Qˆl,n−lxˆ?l,n−l
...
xˆ?i,k−i =
1
k + 1
(
Pˆi−1,k−ixˆ?i−1,k−i + Qˆi,k−i−1xˆ
?
i,k−i−1
)
(1 ≤ k < n, 0 ≤ i ≤ k)
...
xˆ?i,n−i =
(
Pˆi−1,n−ixˆ?i−1,n−i + Qˆi,n−i−1xˆ
?
i,n−i−1
)
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) (32)
Here xˆ denotes the w = 0 limit. Similarly, Pˆi,j = (1 − u)i + uj and Qˆi,j =
ui + (1 − u)j are zero selection limits of Pi,j and Qi,j . The solutions xˆi,j have
the following properties: (i) x?i,j = x
?
j,i. (ii) The frequencies of type 0 and type 1
cells are the same:
∑
i,k ix
?
i,k−i =
∑
i,k ix
?
k−i,i = 1/2. (iii) The total abundance
of cells in complexes of the same size, k, is independent of the mutation rate.
5. The σ-condition for n ≥ 2
In this section we derive the σ-condition for the generalized model introduced
in previous section at the weak selection limit. For n = 2, we showed that
σ2(u) = (1 − u)/u. It turns out that for n > 2 the parameter σn in Eq. 11,
is now given by a ratio of two polynomials of degree n − 1 in u. In fact the
general form for σn(u) is (cn − hn(u))/hn(u). Here hn(u) is a polynomial in u,
and cn is a numerical constant. The symmetry of the σ-condition is preserved
as we increase the maximum complex size. We will later compare numerical
solutions for strategy selection in the general model and analytical prediction
of σ-condition. We observe that our predicted σ-condition holds well above the
weak selection limit as well.
We rewrite Eq. 31 in the following form
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x?1,0 =
1
φ?
( n∑
l=0
Pl,n−lx?l,n−l − x?1,0
)
x?0,1 =
1
φ?
( n∑
l=0
Ql,n−lx?l,n−l − x?0,1
)
...
x?i,k−i =
1
φ?
{(
Pi−1,k−1x?i−1,k−i +Qi,k−i−1x
?
i,k−i−1
)
−
(
Pi,k−i +Qi,k−i
)
x?i,k−i
}
(1 ≤ k < n, 0 ≤ i ≤ k)
...
x?i,n−i =
1
φ?
(
Pi−1,n−ix?i−1,n−i +Qi,n−i−1x
?
i,n−i−1
)
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) (33)
Total number of type 0 and type 1 cells are written in terms of solutions of
Eq. 33 as
x?tot,0 =
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
i · x?i,k−i
x?tot,1 =
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
(k − i) · x?i,k−i (34)
The condition for type 0 selection, Eq. 7, is x?tot,0 > x
?
tot,1. To have a
first order estimate of abundances in powers of selection intensity we substitute
xi,j in left-hand side of Eq. 33 with w = 0 limit solutions, xˆi,j . This way
xi,k−i from left-hand side of Eq. 33 is expressed to zeroth and first order in
w. Substituting solutions into Eq. 34 and Eq. 7 gives rise to a closed form
generalized σ-condition. After some straightforward algebra we get
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
Pi,k−ixˆ?i,k−i >
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
Qi,k−ixˆ?i,k−i (35)
This is a generalization of Eq. 14. We can write this in terms of fitness gains
of either of type 0 and 1 strategies as we did for n = 2 case. Denoting fitness
gains for type 0 and type 1 in weak selection by δf0,n and δf1,n, respectively,
we can write:
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δf0,n =
n∑
k=2
k∑
i=1
i
(
(i− 1)a+ (k − i)b) · xˆ?i,k−i
δf1,n =
n∑
k=2
k∑
i=1
i
(
(i− 1)d+ (k − i)c) · xˆ?k−i,i (36)
Then Eq. 35 can be rewritten as(
u− 1
2
)(
δf0,n − δf1,n
)
< 0 (37)
The zeros of the term δf0,n − δf1,n determine u1 whereas u2 is zero of u− 1/2.
Let us consider n = 3 as an example. In this case Eq. 35 is written as
P3,0xˆ
?
3,0 + P2,1xˆ
?
2,1 + P1,2xˆ
?
1,2 + P0,3xˆ
?
0,3
+P2,0xˆ
?
2,0 + P1,1xˆ
?
1,1 + P0,2xˆ
?
0,2 + P1,0xˆ
?
1,0 + P0,1xˆ
?
0,1
>
Q3,0xˆ
?
3,0 +Q2,1xˆ
?
2,1 +Q1,2xˆ
?
1,2 +Q0,3xˆ
?
0,3
+Q0,2xˆ
?
0,2 +Q1,1xˆ
?
1,1 +Q2,0xˆ
?
2,0 +Q1,0xˆ
?
1,0 +Q0,1xˆ
?
0,1 (38)
The terms corresponding to singlets xˆ1,0, xˆ0,1 can be dropped from both sides
of the inequality since they do not confer any fitness gain or loss. Similarly Eq.
37 is (
u− 1
2
)(
δf0,3 − δf1,3
)
< 0 (39)
The fitness gains δf0,3 and δf1,3 are
δf0,3 = 2a · xˆ?2,0 + b · xˆ?1,1
+ 6a · xˆ?3,0 + 2
(
a+ b
) · xˆ?2,1 + 2b · xˆ?1,2
δf1,3 = 2d · xˆ?0,2 + c · xˆ?1,1
+ 6a · xˆ?0,3 + 2
(
d+ c
) · xˆ?1,2 + 2c · xˆ?2,1
(40)
The n = 3 solutions for Eq. 32 are
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xˆ1,0 = xˆ0,1 =
3
22
xˆ?2,0, = xˆ
?
3,0 =
1− u
22
xˆ?1,1 =
u
11
xˆ?3,0 = xˆ
?
0,3 =
(1− u)2
11
xˆ?2,1 = xˆ
?
1,2 =
u(2− u)
11
(41)
Substituting the above results back into Eq. 40 we can write the σ-condition,
Eq. 39, as (
u− 1
2
)(
(a− d)4u
2 − 9u+ 7
−4u2 + 9u + (b− c)
)
< 0 (42)
Now u1 is the solution of (a− d)(4u2 − 9u+ 7)/(9u− 4u2) + (b− c) = 0.
We have numerically solved the model for n = 3 and B = 5 and C = 1 for
the cooperation game and the hawk-dove game. Predicted values for u1 and u2
are in excellent agreement for various selection intensities (Fig. 8). The phase
diagrams for these games are depicted in Fig. 9 for w = 0.1 and 0.3. The phase
boundaries match very well with the results from Eq. 42.
The same method can be used for larger maximum complex sizes at weak
selection. Substituting for xˆi,k−i from solutions of Eq. 32 into Eq. 36 we can
write
δf0,n =
(
cn − hn(u)
)
a+ hn(u)b
δf1,n = hn(u)c+ (cn − hn(u)
)
d (43)
From Eq. 36, the polynomial hn(u) and the constant cn are expressed in terms
of xˆi,k−i solutions
hn(u) =
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
i(k − i)xˆ?i,k−i
cn =
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=0
i(k − 1)xˆ?i,k−i (44)
Using properties of Eq. 32 solutions, we can show that cn is in fact a con-
stant. For n = 2, we have c2(u) = 1 and h2(u) = u. For n = 3, from Eq.
42 we have c3 = 7 and h3(u) = −4u2 + 9u (up to a constant common factor).
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Figure 8: Numerical solutions of x?tot,0 and x
?
tot,1 for n = 3 for the cooperation game (top) and
the hawk-dove game (bottom). Total abundances of each strategy are plotted as a function
of u. Parameters are B = 5, C = 1 and w = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 (the curvature increases with w.)
Notice that the main difference between n = 2 and n = 3 is the slight change in the value of
u1. While for n = 2 the value of u1 was independent of the selection intensity, for n = 3 it is
weakly dependent on w, but this is almost impossible to see from these plots.
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Figure 9: Phase diagram for the cooperation game (top) and the hawk-dove game (bottom)
for maximum complex size, n = 3. a) Cooperators are favored for u < u1 and u2 < u and
B > C (regions I and III). b) Hawks are favored for u1 < u < u2 and B > 2C (region II).
As can be seen, the numerical and analytical results for phase boundaries are in excellent
agreement.
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Repeating the same steps for higher complex sizes we have computed σn for
n = 2, . . . , 20. To avoid long formulas, below we write σn for only n = 2, . . . , 7
σ2 =
1− u
u
σ3 =
4u2 − 9u+ 7
−4u2 + 9u
σ4 =
−8u3 + 28u2 − 35u+ 23
8u3 − 28u2 + 35u
σ5 =
32u4 − 160u3 + 308u2 − 281u+ 163
−32u4 + 160u3 − 308u2 + 281u
σ6 =
−64u5 + 432u4 − 1176u3 + 1640u2 − 1215u+ 639
64u5 − 432u4 + 1176u3 − 1640u2 + 1215u
σ7 =
256u6 − 2240u5 + 8160u4 +−5968u3 + 17980u2 − 11439u+ 5553
−256u6 + 2240u5 − 8160u4 + 15968u3 − 17980u2 + 11439u
(45)
The results are plotted for n = 2, . . . , 20 in Fig. 10. As can be seen from
above results, hn(u) always has a zero at u = 0. Also cn is always a positive
constant. The value of the critical mutation rate, u1, is obtained from the
equality
σn(u1) =
c− b
a− d (46)
which can be solved for u1 using Eq. 45. These estimated values of u1 are
compared with numerical solutions of the model for various n, for the game of
cooperation (Tabel 1) and the hawk-dove game (Table 2). Numerical values of
u1 are calculated for two selection intensities, w = 0.01 and w = 0.1 up to n = 7
while theoretical estimate of u1, Eq. 46, is presented up to n = 20.
We can now ask, for the general model, if the condition for evolutionary
stability of a strategy is the same as in the case n = 2, which is a > d. Proving
a strategy is ESS by calculating the eigenvalues of the Jacobian is a cumbersome
procedure for arbitrary n. Instead we assume that limit of u→ 0 of σ-condition
lead to type 0 being ESS. We proved this in Appendix B for n = 2 in weak
selection. For u→ 0 and 2 ≤ n ≤ 7, σn’s from Eq. 45 have the limiting forms
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max. size, n uc,analytic uc,num(w = 0.01) uc,num(w = 0.1)
2 0.400 0.400 0.400
3 0.373 0.373 0.377
4 0.352 0.353 0.359
5 0.335 0.336 0.346
6 0.321 0.325 0.322
7 0.309 0.306 0.312
10 0.281 - -
15 0.251 - -
20 0.231 - -
Table 1: The critical mutation rate, u1, for the game of cooperation. Cooperators are favored
if u < u1. Parameter values are B = 5 and C = 1. Numerical solutions for w = 0.01 and
w = 0.1 are shown up to n = 7.
max. size, n uc,analytic uc,num(w = 0.01) uc,num(w = 0.1)
2 0.090 0.090 0.090
3 0.073 0.073 0.073
4 0.063 0.063 0.063
5 0.056 0.056 0.057
6 0.051 0.053 0.053
7 0.047 0.042 0.049
10 0.040 - -
15 0.034 - -
20 0.029 - -
Table 2: The critical mutation rate, u1, for the hawk-dove game. Doves are favored for u < u1.
Parameter values are B = 5 and C = 1. Numerical solutions for w = 0.01 and w = 0.1 are
shown up to n = 7.
σ2(u→ 0) = 1− u
u
σ3(u→ 0) ∼ (7/9)− u
u
σ4(u→ 0) ∼ (23/35)− u
u
σ5(u→ 0) ∼ (163/281)− u
u
σ6(u→ 0) ∼ (639/1215)− u
u
σ7(u→ 0) ∼ (5553/11439)− u
u
(47)
The leading term coefficients 1, 7/9, 23/35, . . . are all positive and thus in the
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Figure 10: The value of σ versus the mutation rate, u, is shown for various maximum complex
sizes n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 20.
limit u→ 0 lead to a > d.
Substituting the above results into Eq. 46, one can see that no matter how
large n is, the value of u1 always remains positive. In other words, the phase
boundary (u1,B/C) does not hit the y-axis for some large-n. If type 0 is ESS
for a given game at a small value of n, it will remain ESS also for large n.
Interestingly the plot of sigma versus the mutation rate also represents part of
the phase boundary in the hawk- dove game. From Eq. 46 and substituting
payoff values for the hawk-dove game, we have σ(u1) = 2(B/C). For large-n,
as can be seen from Fig. 10, the phase boundary seems to be reaching an
asymptote. We can confer from this observation that for large complex sizes we
still expect dove to be the dominant strategy.
6. Discussion
The evolution of multicellularity is often treated in a framework that distin-
guishes (‘decouples’) the fitness of an individual within a group and the overall
fitness of the group, with these quantities deriving from a simple cooperative
dilemma such as a linear public goods game. While this conceptual framework
has been very useful in understanding many aspects of the transition to multi-
cellularity (Rainey and Kerr, 2010), it can be restrictive in many cases. In par-
ticular, it often does not adequately account for the interactions of cells within
a group, which are likely to be game-theoretic (i.e., frequency-dependent). One
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particularly clear example is when some cell types are more likely than oth-
ers to act as reproductive propagules. In the demonstration of Ratcliff et al
(2012) that some cells in multicellular yeast clusters undergo apoptosis (osten-
sibly to help break the group up into several smaller multi-cellular propagules),
apoptosed cells obviously cannot propagate further (Libby et al, 2014). If the
likelihood of a cell’s apoptosing depends on its genotype, then a model that is
not game-theoretic cannot account for this important phenomenon.
Another example of explicitly game-theoretic interactions within multicellu-
lar groups is the competition between ‘cooperator’ and ‘cheater’ strains of yeast
which use different glucose metabolism (MacLean and Gudelj, 2006; Pfeiffer
et al, 2001). In such setups, selection dynamics between different phenotypes
with different rates of ATP yield follow a prisoner’s dilemma (MacLean and
Gudelj, 2006). If staying together (and the concomitant ability to form groups)
has already evolved in the population, a model that accounts for this frequency
dependence is required if we are adequately to model the evolutionary dynamics
of the population.
For these reasons, the construction of a more general, frequency-dependent
framework is desirable. In the model developed in this paper, cells divide and
stay together until they reach a complex of a certain size. Subsequent cell
divisions lead to single cells that leave and start their own complexes. The
reproductive rate of a cell is determined by a game based on interactions of
cells within a complex, and is therefore explicitly frequency-dependent. This
game can represent competition for resources, exchange of nutrients, cellular
communication, or energy sharing mechanisms.
Studying the evolutionary dynamics of this setup, we determined how this
population structure affects the outcome of evolutionary games in the presence
of mutation. In particular, we showed that the condition for one strategy to be
more abundant than the other strategy in the mutation-selection equilibrium
has the same symmetry as the σ condition of stochastic evolutionary dynamics
(Tarnita et al, 2009b). We calculated the value of σ and examined it for the
game of cooperation and the hawk-dove game.
An important feature of our model is the suppression of the cheater pheno-
type during the evolution of multicellularity. Since the selection dynamics in-
side each complex is frequency-dependent (for example, a prisoner’s dilemma), a
cheater phenotype that appears inside a cooperating colony has a lower chance
of becoming abundant inside the group. In other words, a game-theoretic in-
teractions at all levels, individuals and groups, can lead to suppression of the
cheater strategy without the need for evolution of new mechanisms of conflict
mediation. This is the case when the cooperative phenotype is evolutionarily
stable for small mutation rates. Our model also allows us to characterize the
critical level of group diversity, the mutation rate uc,1, above which a cheater
phenotype destabilizes cooperation inside the group.
We see our study primarily as a contribution toward understanding how
population structure affects evolutionary dynamics (Nowak et al, 2010a). We
have quantified to what extent the population structure of simple multicellular-
ity, perhaps as found at the various origins of multicellularity, is conducive to
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favoring cooperation. Cooperation is thought to be crucially involved in evolu-
tionary transitions such as the emergence of multicellularity (Maynard Smith
and Szathma´ry, 1997; Nowak, 2006a; Nowak and Highfield, 2011). Conversely,
the somatic evolution of cancer is seen as a breakdown of cooperation among
the cells of an organism.
We have allowed throughout for the possibility of very high mutation rates.
This is no mere theoretical fancy. While mutations by nucleotide substitution
and gene conversion are relatively rare, there are many other sources of frequent
mutation.
Mutation in our model is perfectly consistent, for example, with epigenetically-
induced heritable phenotype switching, such as that observed in experimental
populations of Pseudomonas bacteria (Beaumont et al, 2009), a model organism
in the field of experimental multicellularity (Rainey and Rainey, 2003; Nikolaev
and Plakunov, 2007; Hammerschmidt et al, 2014). Epigenetic mutations in gen-
eral, so long as they are heritable, are consistent with our model, and are known
in some cases to occur far more frequently than sequence mutations (van der
Graaf et al, 2015).
Another source of frequent mutation involves unstable genetic architectures.
In Pseudomonas, for example, modularity of the genetic architecture underlying
the group-forming phenotype allows it to arise often and in multiple different
ways (McDonald et al, 2009; Rainey and Kerr, 2010).
The directed gene transposition and epigenetic control underlying mating-
type switching in yeast (Klar and Fogel, 1979; Klar, 1987, 2007), another model
organism in experimental multicellularity (Koschwanez et al, 2011; Ratcliff et al,
2012), are also consistent with our model. In fission yeast (Schizosaccharomyces
pombe), mating-type switching is more regular than mutation is in our model
(Miyata and Miyata, 1981; Egel, 1984), but its high frequency and heritability
(Klar, 1987, 2007) suggest that genetic mechanisms of the sort underlying it
could justify the consideration of very high mutation rates in our model.
These examples all suggest that high mutation rates might be sufficiently
common in organisms undergoing the transition to multicellularity to justify the
importance of high mutation rates in our model and its results. It is important to
note that mutations in our model must be heritable; for example, non-heritable
phenotype switching and cell differentiation in response to environmental cues
are ruled out.
Extensions of our model to include cases where staying together is stochastic,
which means that cells can leave a given complex with a certain probability, more
complicated life cycles, as well as asymmetric mutations are subjects of future
works. While our current model is deterministic, the extension to stochastic
dynamics and finite total population size should be straightforward.
Our model does not study important questions such as the different impli-
cations of staying together versus coming together (Tarnita et al, 2013) or the
evolution of germ line soma separation (Michod and Nedelcu, 2003; Michod and
Roze, 2001) or the evolution of simple versus complex multicellularity (Knoll,
2011) for which we refer to the existing literature.
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Appendix A. Exact solutions for n = 2
In this appendix we present derivation of equilibrium solutions for n = 2.
Putting time derivatives to zero in Eq. 1, we have
x?0 =
1
φ? + 1
(
P00x
?
00 + P01x
?
01 + P11x
?
11
)
x?1 =
1
φ? + 1
(
Q00x
?
00 +Q01x
?
01 +Q11x
?
11
)
x?00 =
(1− u)x?0
φ?
x?01 =
u(x?0 + x
?
1)
φ?
x?11 =
(1− u)x?1
φ?
(A.1)
Substituting for complex abundances from last three equations into first two
equations in A.1 and dividing them we obtain the following relation for η? =
x?1/x
?
0
η? =
(
Q00(1− u) +Q01u
)
+
(
Q11(1− u) +Q01u
)
η?(
P00(1− u) + P01u
)
+
(
P11(1− u) + P01u
)
η?
(A.2)
Average fitness function at equilibrium, φ?, can be expressed in terms of η? as
well
(φ?)2 + φ? =
1
1 + η?
{(
P00 +Q00
)
(1− u) + (P01 +Q01)u
+
((
(P11 +Q11
)
(1− u) + (P01 +Q01)u)η?} (A.3)
The above equations, A.2 and A.3, can be rewritten as quadratic equations
A(η?)2 +Bη? − C = 0
(φ?)2 + φ? − 1
1 + η?
(
D0 +D1η
?
)
= 0 (A.4)
Coefficients A,B,C,D0 and D1 are expressed in terms of payoff coefficients and
mutation rate
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A ≡ (1− u)P11 + uP01
=
((− 2 + w(c− b− 2d))u+ ((b+ 2d)w + 3))u
B ≡ (P00 −Q11)(1− u) + (P01 −Q01)u
=
(
2w(a− b+ c− d)u2 + w(4(d− a) + b− c)u+ 2w(a− d)
C ≡ Q00(1− u) +Q01u
=
(
(b− 2a− c)w − 2)u2 + ((2a+ c))w + 3)u
D0 ≡
(
(P00 +Q00)(1− u) + (P01 +Q01)u
)
= 2(1 + wa)(1− u) + (2 + w(b+ c))u
D1 ≡
(
(P11 +Q11)(1− u) + (P01 +Q01)u
)
= 2(1 + wd)(1− u) + (2 + w(b+ c))u
(A.5)
Values of η? and φ? are thus given by
η? =
−B +√B2 + 4AC
2A
φ? =
−1 +
√
1 + 4
(D0 +D1η
?)
1 + η?
2
(A.6)
CoefficientsA,C,D0 andD1 in Eq. A.5 are positive since coefficients P00, P01,
P11 and Q00, Q01, Q11 are positive for 0 < u < 1. Both η
? as the ratio of two
abundance, and φ? as average fitness should be positive as well. Thus solu-
tions for Eq. A.6 are unique positive solutions of Eq. A.4. Given η? and φ?,
abundances of singlet and doublet complexes at equilibrium x?0, x
?
1, x
?
00, x
?
01, x
?
11
are
x?0 =
φ?
2 + φ?
1
1 + η?
x?1 =
φ?
2 + φ?
η?
η? + 1
x?00 =
1− u
2 + φ?
1
1 + η?
x?01 =
u
2 + φ?
x?11 =
1− u
2 + φ?
η?
1 + η?
(A.7)
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We used x?0+x
?
1 = φ
?/(2+φ?). This can be checked by substituitng steady state
solutions x?00, x
?
01, x
?
11 from Eq. A.1 into identity x
?
0+x
?+2(x?00+x
?
01+x
?
11) = 1.
Appendix B. Evolutionary stability for n = 2
In this appendix we present some technical details of the results on stability
of the equilibrium solutions and ESS condition for n = 2. We write Eq. 1 as
dxi
dt
= Fi
(
x0, x1, x00, x11
)
(B.1)
where i ∈ {0, 1, 00, 11}. Mixed complex x01 is expressed in terms of other
variables
x01 =
1
2
(
1− x0 − x1 − 2x00 − 2x11
)
(B.2)
To address stability we linearize time derivative operator, Fi
(
x0, x1, x00, x11
)
around a fixed point. For a stable fixed point, all real parts of eigenvalues of
the linearized Fi
(
x0, x1, x00, x11
)
, i.e. Jacboian, should be negative. At u = 0
and for zero-selection, w = 0, average fitness φ = 1. Jacobian has following
eigenvalues and eigenvectors: λ
(0)
1 = 0, ~v1 = (−1, 1,−1, 1), λ(0)2 = −1, ~v2 =
(0, 0, 1, 1), λ
(0)
3 = −3, ~v3 = (2,−2,−1, 1), λ(0)4 = −3, ~v4 = (2, 2,−1,−1). At
weak selection the above eigen-directions are slightly modified due to game
payoff contribution to the fitness of type 0 and type 1 strategies. Particularly,
the direction corresponding to λ
(0)
1 = 0 can become unstable.
To check this we focus on the type 0 fixed point (x?0, 0, x
?
00, 0) (denoted by
(i)). We perturb it along the ~v1 direction
x0 = x
?
0 −→ x?0 −
δx
3
x1 = 0 −→ δx
3
x00 = x
?
00 −→ x?00 −
δx
3
x01 = 0 −→ 0
x11 = 0 −→ δx
3
(B.3)
This corresponds to introducing a small fraction δx of type 1 cells to the system:
xtot,1 → δx, xtot,0 → 1− δx. Substituting into Eq. 1 (or Eq. B.1) and keeping
terms up to lowest order in w we obtain linearized equation around the fixed
point (x?0, x
?
1 = 0, x
?
00, x
?
01 = 0, x
?
11 = 0)
dδx
dt
≈ −2w
3
(
a− d)δx+O(w2) (B.4)
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which indicates corresponding eigenvalue λ
(i)
1 ≈ −(2w/3)(a − d). For a > d
and independent of off-diagonal payoff coefficients, b and c, a fixed point of
(x?0, 0, x
?
00, 0) is ESS. Similar condition can be obtained by linearizing time
opertaor around type 1 fixed point, (0, x?1, 0, x
?
11). This leads to eigenvalue,
λ
(ii)
1 ≈ (2w/3)(a − d) ((ii) denotes type 1 fixed point). Thus for the Jacobian
matrix, Jij , defined as
Jij =
∂Fi
∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣
~x=~x?
, ~x = (x0, x1, x00, x11) (B.5)
all the eigenvalues can be calculated to the leading order of selection intensity.
For type 0 fixed point we obtain
λ
(i)
1 ≈ −
2
3
(
a− d)w +O(w2)
λ
(i)
2 ≈ −1−
2
3
aw +O(w2)
λ
(i)
3 ≈ −3 +
(
a− 1
3
d+ |a− d|
)
w +O(w2)
λ
(i)
4 ≈ −3 +
(
a− 1
3
d− |a− d|
)
w +O(w2)
(B.6)
We numerically calculated all the eigenvalues around both fixed-points at
u = 0. For w = 0.01 results matched very well with Eq. B.6. For larger
intensities of selection there are deviations from Eq. B.6. However it seems
that the ESS condition, a > d, still holds away from weak selection as well.
Fig. B.11 shows numerical results for eigenvalues around both fixed points at
u = 0 for the game of cooperation and the hawk-dove game. Eigenvalues are
plotted as a function of B/C and for w = 0.5. For the game of cooperation as
the benefit to cost ratio passes unity, B/C = 1, the eigenvalue λ(i)1 switches sign
thus indicting the type 0 is evolutionary stable for B > C.
For n > 2 the above analysis can be tedious but in principle the same steps
can be done. The same result, however, can be intuitively understood. For finite
u there is a single equilibrium state that is globally attractive inside the multi-
dimensional simplex of states. As u → 0 this fixed point moves approaches to
the ESS fixed point among the two fixed point for u = 0. This is indicated by
the σ-condition. The strategy that is favoured by σ-condition as u → 0 is the
ESS.
Appendix C. Exact solutions for n = 3
Here we present a sketch of derivation of exact solutions for model with
maximum three-cell complexes. The equilibrium abundances for n = 3 satisfy
the coupled system of equation:
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Figure B.11: Numerical results for eigenvalues for the game of cooperation (top) and haw-dove
game (bottom). The eigenvalues are plotted as a function of B/C for u = 0 and w = 0.5.
Eigenvalues of type 0 fixed point, λ
(i)
1,2,3,4, and type 1 fixed point, λ
(ii)
1,2,3,4, are plotted. ESS
condition for type 0 is B/C > 1 for the game of cooperation. As can be seen at value B = C,
λ
(i.ii)
1 changes sign. For the hawk-dove game however, dove strategy is always ESS at u = 0.
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x?1,0 =
1
1 + φ?
(
P3,0x
?
3,0 + P2,1x
?
2,1 + P1,2x
?
1,2 + P0,3x
?
0,3
)
x?0,1 =
1
1 + φ?
(
Q3,0x
?
3,0 +Q2,1x
?
2,1 +Q1,2x
?
1,2 +Q0,3x
?
0,3
)
x?2,0 =
1
P2,0 +Q2,0 + φ?
P1,0x
?
1,0
x?1,1 =
1
P1,1 +Q1,1 + φ?
(
P0,1x
?
0,1 +Q1,0x
?
1,0
)
x?0,2 =
1
P0,2 +Q0,2 + φ?
Q0,1x
?
0,1
x?3,0 =
1
φ?
P2,0x
?
2,0
x?2,1 =
1
φ?
(
P1,1x
?
1,1 +Q2,0x
?
2,0
)
x?1,2 =
1
φ?
(
P0,2x
?
0,2 +Q1,1x
?
1,1
)
x?0,3 =
1
φ?
Q0,2x
?
0,2 (C.1)
Coefficients Pi,j and Qi,j are given by Eq. 30. We also have P1,0 = Q0,1 =
1− u, P0,1 = Q1,0 = u. Similar to n = 2 case, solutions x?i,3−i can be expressed
in terms of ratio of singlets η? = x?1/x
?
0 and total fitness φ
?. Upon dividing the
first two equations in Eq. C.1 and substituting for abundances from rest of the
equations we obtain a quadratic equation for η?
η? =
{
Q3,0
( P2,0
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
(1− u)
)
+Q2,1
(
P1,1
u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
(1 + η?)
+
Q2,0(1− u)
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
)
+Q1,2
( P0,2(1− u)
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η? +
Q1,1u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
(η? + 1)
)
+ Q0,3
( Q0,2(1− u)
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η?
)}/{
P3,0
( P2,0
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
(1− u)
)
+ P2,1
(
P1,1
u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
(1 + η?) +
Q2,0(1− u)
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
)
+ P1,2
( P0,2(1− u)
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η? +
Q1,1u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
(η? + 1)
)
+ P0,3
( Q0,2(1− u)
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η?
)}
(C.2)
singlet and complex abundances, up to the common factor, x?0,1 + x
?
1,0, are
expressed in terms of η? and φ? from Eq. C.1,
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x?2,0 =
1− u
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
1
1 + η?
(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?1,1 =
u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?0,2 =
1− u
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η?
1 + η?
(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?3,0 =
1
φ?
P2,0
( 1− u
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
1
1 + η?
)(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?2,1 =
1
φ?
(
P1,1
u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
+Q2,0
1− u
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
η?
1 + η?
)(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?1,2 =
1
φ?
(
P0,2
1− u
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η?
1 + η?
+Q1,1
u
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
)(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
x?0,3 =
1
φ?
Q0,2
1− u
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
η?
1 + η?
(
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1
)
(C.3)
Substituting these into condition x?1,0 + x
?
0,1 + 2
(
x?2,0 + x
?
1,1 + x
?
0,2
)
+ 3(x?3,0 +
x?2,1 + x
?
1,2 + x
?
0,3
)
= 1, we obtain x?1,0 + x
?
0,1 in terms of η
? and φ?
x?1,0 + x
?
0,1 = φ
?
/{
φ? +
1
1 + η?
×
[((
3(P2,0 +Q2,0
)
+ 2φ?
) 1− u
φ? + P2,0 +Q2,0
+
((
3(P1,1 +Q1,1
)
+ 2φ?
) u(1 + η?)
φ? + P1,1 +Q1,1
+
((
3(P0,2 +Q0,2
)
+ 2φ?
) (1− u)η?
φ? + P0,2 +Q0,2
)]}
(C.4)
φ? is obtained from substituting above solutions, Eq. C.3 and Eq. C.4 into
φ? =
(
P3,0 +Q3,0
)
x?3,0 +
(
P2,1 +Q2,1
)
x?2,1
+
(
P1,2 +Q1,2
)
x?1,2 +
(
P0,3 +Q0,3
)
x?0,3
+
(
P2,0 +Q2,0
)
x?2,0 +
(
P1,1 +Q1,1
)
x?1,1
+
(
P0,2 +Q0,2
)
x?0,2 + x
?
1,0 + x
?
0,1
(C.5)
Eq. C.2 and Eq. C.5 combined with Eq. C.4 can be solved to obtain closed
form solutions for φ? and η?, which upon subtituting into Eq. C.3 gives all
abundances in terms of payoff values and mutation. This approach in principle
is generalized to n-cell complex model as well. We always get a quadratic
equation in η? coupled with a degree-n equation for φ?. The condition for the
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strategy selection, however, can be answered in weak selection limit without
exact knowledge of individual abundance of different complexes as discussed in
Sec.5.
Appendix D. Well-mixed games with mutation
In this appendix we briefly review unstructured game in the presence of
mutations and compare the condition for neutrality with the one we obtained
for game of multicellularity, Eq. 1. Derivations for finite populations are done
in literature (Tarnita et al, 2009b; Traulsen et al, 2008; Antal et al, 2009a).
Consider a well-mixed population of two populations 0 and 1 with abundances
x0 and x1. Each individual can replicate based on its payoff values determined
by the game and the offspring can mutate with probability u. The dynamics
for two populations is written as,
x˙0 = x0
(
P0x0 + P1x1
)
(1− u) + x1
(
Q0x0 +Q1x1
)
u− x0 − x0φ
x˙1 = x0
(
P0x0 + P1x1
)
u+ x1
(
Q0x0 +Q1x1
)
(1− u)− x1 − x1φ
(D.1)
where fitness functions, P0,1, Q0,1, are given in terms of payoff coefficients a, b, c, d,
and intensity of selection w
P0 = (1 + wa)
P1 = (1 + wb)
Q0 = (1 + wc)
Q1 = (1 + wd) (D.2)
φ is given by
φ = x0
(
P0x0 + P1x1
)
+ x1
(
Q0x0 +Q1x1
)− 1 (D.3)
Enforcing the condition that total frequencies add up to unity, x0 + x1 = 1.
Calling x0 = x(t), we have
d
dt
x(t) = x
(
1−u−x)(P0x+P1(1−x))+(1−x)(u−x)(Q0x+Q1(1−x)), (D.4)
Putting LHS of the above equation to zero for equilibrium solutions (x?) and
assuming type 0 is selected, i.e., x? > 1/2, after some straightforward algebra
we get
a+ b > c+ d (D.5)
which is the σ-condition with σ = 1. Notice that this relationship is independent
of u.
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